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The New Environment of Monetary Policy
I HAVE already attempted to demonstrate that the
progress our nation has made in dealing with economic reces-
sions has not yet been matched by similar progress in dealing
with inflation. In grappling with the Threat of depression, we
have acted on a far larger scale than was ever contemplated
during the 1920's. Not only do we command new tools for
curbing recession, but we are willing to use them with prompt-
ness and vigor. More important still, our minds are prepared,
should the need arise, for additions to the array of counter-
cyclical weapons. In dealing with inflation, we have been less
imaginative and less enterprising. It is true that the govern-
ment is nowadays more concerned with the danger of inflation
than it was in the immediate postwar period, and that fore-
sight and courage have of late been mustered to check ten-
dencies toward inflation as well as recession. Nevertheless, our
intellectual, moral, and practical approach to the problem of
inflation continues to suffer from earlier neglect. The heavy
emphasis that the government has recently placed on a restric-
live credit policy has served to bring us back to the best
thought that ruled on the subject of inflation during the 1920's,
Millar Lecture at Fordham University, October 22, 1957. Reprinted, by
permission of thepublisher,from Prosperity Without Inflation, Fordham
University Press, New York, 1957, pp. 43—65.152TheBusinessCycle in a Changing World
but it has done no more than that. In the meantime the eco-
nomic world has changed profoundly.
I
The great expansion of governmental activities since the 1920's
has reduced the economic area over which a restrictive credit
policy can nowadays be effective. In 1929, federal expenditures
on goods and services accounted for about 1¼ per cent of the
dollar value of the nation's total output. Other forms of
spending—interest payments, pensions, grants-in-aid to the
states, and sundry subsidies—brought total federal expendi-
tures to 2½ per cent of the nation's output. The outlays by
state and local governments were a larger factor in the econ-
omy, but the combined expenditures of all our governmental
units still accounted for less than 10 per cent of the nation's
total output. Since then, governmental outlays have increased
tremendously, in relation to the growth of the economy as well
as in an absolute sense. During the past decade federal ex-
penditures alone have ranged from 13.4 per cent of the dollar
value of the nation's output in 1947 to 21.3 per cent in 1953
and 17.4 per cent in 1956. State and local outlays, which fell
well behind federal expenditures during the 1940's, have also
been catching up of late. The combined sum of federal, state,
and local expenditures was over 104 billion dollars in 1956, or a
little over 25 per cent of the nation's total output. In each of
the four preceding years this percentage was still higher.
Federal expenditures are shaped by numerous and complex
forces on the domestic and international fronts, but they are
practically unaffected by the level of interest rates or the avail-
ability of credit. When federal revenues are high enough to
finance larger outlays, as has been the case since fiscal year
1955, there is no need to resort to financial markets beyondThe NewEnvironment of Monetary Policy153
meeting temporary cash needs and refinancing the debt that
keeps falling due. On the other hand, when deficit finance is
being practiced, the condition of the money market is not
likely to count significantly among the factors that lead the
government to enlarge the deficit or to reduce it. If the federal
government should again find itself spending more than it
raises in taxes, it will not be because money may be borrowed
on easy terms. Nor would the government be inclined to re-
duce its spending merely because borrowing has become
harder. In the last analysis, the federal government has con-
siderable power to shape the markets for money and capital to
suit its ends; and it may well choose to do that rather than per-
mit high objectives of national policy to be thwarted by any
tightness of credit.
State and local governments have no such financial indepen-
dence. However, the rapid growth of population, a continuing
trend toward suburban living, and the shortages that accumu-
lated during the Great Depression and World War II
have created in many communities a sense of urgency with re-
gard to schools, parks, highways, water systems, and other
public improvements. Some projects have of late been shelved
here and there because of statutory ceilings on interest rates or
because of the reluctance of local citizens to assume the
burden of a rising interest rate. Also, offerings of revenue
bonds and other issues of local authorities have in some in-
stances been withdrawn or postponed because of the con-
gested condition of the capital market. By and large, however,
state and local governments have either enjoyed sufficient
revenues to finance theft desired scale of expenditure, or they
have been willing to submit to higher interest rates. The bene-
fits to be derived from most governmental projects cannot be
calculated in dollars, and this of itself tends to blunt the influ-
ence of interest rates. At least during recent years, state and154TheBusiness Cycle in a Changing World
local expenditures have responded neither promptly nor on
any large scale to general credit conditions.
But if government expenditures are largely sheltered from
ordinary fluctuations in the credit market, so also are the
operations of a part of the business world. Moreover, this part
seems to have grown since the 1920's. Many business firms are
able to finance their requirements—whether for new plant and
equipment, or the accumulation of inventories, or the carrying
of receivables—without any borrowing or without much bor-
rowing. What these businesses do is to finance their require-
ments largely from internally generated funds—that is, undis-
tributed profits, depreciation allowances, and related charges.
From 1947 through 1956 corporations retained, on the average,
54 per cent of theft profits. Between 1923 and 1929, on the
other hand, retained corporate income averaged only 33 per
cent. Depreciation funds and other allowances for capital con-
sumption have likewise become of larger importance in cor-
porate financing. In all, the internally generated funds of busi-
ness corporations exceeded their externally raised funds—that
is, new capital issues, bank loans, mortgages, trade debt, and
other liabilities—by 42 per cent during the decade from 1947
through 1956. Between 1923 and 1929, on the other hand, cor-
porate internal funds appear to have exceeded theft external
funds by about 10 or 20 per cent.
The requirements for external financing have, of course, in-
creased greatly in an absolute sense. Not only that, but during
the recent boom, corporations have found it necessary to turn
increasingly to banks and the capital market to finance theft
vast expansion and improvement programs. Whereas internal
funds exceeded external funds by 42 per cent over the full
period from 1947 through 1956, this excess dropped to 26 per
cent during the last two years of the period. Despite the recent
revival of stock issues, borrowing has continued to be the pre-The New Environment of Monetary Policy155
ponderantsource of external capital for corporations. How-
ever, in view of the steep rates of taxation that have ruled of
late and in view of the rapidly growing use of amortizable
loans, interest rates appear to have had less influence on cor-
porate borrowing and investment than they had during the
1920's or earlier times of our history.
Interest charges are rarely a large element in business costs,
and their practical importance has tended to become smaller
as a result of high taxes. A rise in the rate of interest from 4 to
5 per cent will raise annual interest charges from $4,000 to
$5,000 on a loan of $100,000. But with a basic federal tax rate
of 52 per cent on corporate income, the net added cost to a
sizable corporation that manages to stay in the black is $480,
not $1,000. In fact, the net added cost is likely to be even
smaller, since about two-thirds of the states nowadays levy a
tax on corporate income which, while quite small relative to
the federal tax, is not negligible either financially or psycholog-
ically. In the case of unincorporated businesses or households,
the high rates of the personal income tax in the middle and
upper income brackets likewise take some of the sting out of a
rising interest rate. During the 1920's income taxes were, of
course, much less formidable and therefore interfered less with
the effects of interest rates. The federal tax rate on corporate
incomes in those years was 13½ per cent at its highest, federal
taxes on individual incomes were much lower than at present,
and only a minority of states as yet imposed any income taxes.
Hence, allowing for taxes, a rise of interest rates from, say, 4 to
5 per cent meant just about that during the 1920's, while
nowadays it means roughly a rise of only bali that size—that
is, from 2 to 2½ per cent—for many borrowers, at least some
of whom are sure to ignore so small an increase in cost.
Another factor that has served to blur the influence of a ris-
ing interest rate is the development and rapid growth during156TheBusinessCycle in a Changing World
the past ten or twenty years of versatile instruments calling for
systematic amortization of loans. Term loans to business run-
fling up to five or ten years were practically unknown during
the 1920's. Nowadays, they are a significant item in the port-
folios of many insurance companies as well as of commercial
banks. The long-term fully amortizable mortgage was largely
developed during the 1930's, in connection with governmental
efforts to stimulate homebuilding activity. This type of loan,
which was of interest mainly to savings and loan associations
during the 1920's, now dominates the mortgage market. Con-
sumer installment loans were already of some consequence dur-
ing the 1920's, but they have grown immensely since then in
relation both to consumer incomes and to retail trade. The
essential feature of these newer loan instruments is that they
can be tailored to the needs of the borrower. The interest rate
remains, of course, one of the terms of the loan contract. How-
ever, since other terms can also be varied, the importance of
the interest rate is often reduced or obscured.
A rise in the interest rate is never welcome news to a bor-
rower. But a businessman is apt to be less troubled by a rise in
the interest rate if other dimensions of the loan contract are
adjusted to his liking; for example, by lengthening the term to
maturity and arranging a convenient repayment schedule. Cer-
tainly, the size of the initial down payment and the amount of
the monthly installment are more vital to the typical buyer of
an automobile on crçdit than the precise level of the interest
rate that must be paid on the loan. The same is true of the
buyer of a television set, an air conditioning unit, or a new
home. Indeed, the deterrent effect of higher prices, to say
nothing of higher interest rates, can often be offset by length-
ening the period over which the loan can be repaid or by re-
ducing the required down payment on the purchase. Recent
experience has demonstrated that such liberalization of theThe New Environment of Monetary Policy157
termsof loans can go on for a time on a very considerable scale
in the face of a restrictive credit policy and rising market inter-
est rates. During the greater part of 1955, credit terms were ex-
tensively liberalized on installment sales of automobiles and on
veterans' mortgage loans. Although terms stiffened on mort-
gage loans in 1956, the average maturity of automobile loans
continued to increase, particularly in the case of used cars.
Even this year there has been little evidence of any significant
tightening of terms.
Of course, direct rationing of available funds by lenders
always goes hand in hand with the impersonal rationing
through market interest rates. But if higher taxes and more
flexible loan contracts have tended to reduce the restraining in-
fluence on the nation's business of a rising interest rate, other
financial developments have served to lessen the control of the
monetary authorities over the availability of loan capital.
The Federal Reserve System can exercise a decisive influ-
ence on the level of reserves and therefore on the total assets of
its members, which are preponderantly commercial banks. The
Federal Reserve System wields no authority, however, over
other financial intermediaries such as life insurance companies,
savings and loan associations, savings banks, investment com-
panies, and pension funds. In the aggregate, institutions over
which the Federal Reserve System has only an indirect and
somewhat remote influence have been growing more rapidly
than commercial banks. In 1955 the assets of commercial banks
were about four and one-half times as large as in 1922. On the
other hand, the combined assets of mutual savings banks, the
postal savings system, credit unions, and savings and loan
associations were about eight times as large. The combined
assets of life insurance companies, other insurers, and private
and public pension funds were sixteen times as large. The
assets of government lending institutions and of investment158TheBusiness Cycle in a Changing World
companies have increased still faster. As a result of these un-
even trends, the assets of commercial banks, which at the end
of 1922 somewhat exceeded the combined assets of other
financial institutions exclusive of the Federal Reserve Banks,
amounted to only 52 per cent of the total assets of these other
financial institutions at the end of 1955.
The fortunes of commercial banks have not been subject to
any simple trend such as the statistics just cited may suggest.
The assets of commercial banks changed little in relation to the
assets of other financial institutions during the first two de-
cades of the century. The relative position of commercial
banks then declined during the 1920's, but rose again be-
tween 1933 and 1945. It has declined sharply since then, and
now appears to be lower than at any time at least since 1900.
Although the assets of commercial banks increased 50 billion
dollars between the end of 1945 and the end of 1955, the assets
of other financial intermediaries, again excluding the Federal
Reserve Banks increased about 230 billion dollars. This dis-
parity of growth appears to be continuing. During 1956 the
assets of commercial banks increased 7 billion dollars, while
the assets of other financial intermediaries increased about 25
billion dollars.
Since the end of World War II the spectacular growth of the
assets of financial institutions other than commercial banks re-
flects only in small part the rise in stock prices. What it basi-
cally signifies is the efficiency of financial markets in assem-
bling "idle" funds and putting them to work in commerce and
industry. This process not only can continue in the face of re-
strictions on the growth of commercial bank assets, but it is
even likely for a time to be accelerated by a restrictive credit
policy. A rise of interest rates increases the cost of holding de-
mand deposits, on which commercial banks have been forbid-
den to pay interest since 1935. Hence, rising interest rates, es-The New Environment of Monetary Policy159
peciallyif the movement is of considerable magnitude and
duration, tend to stimulate both consumers and business firms
to convert their cash balances into earning assets. This can
often be done without any significant loss of liquidity. For
example, when an individual draws on his checking account to
buy a life insurance policy or to acquire savings and loan
shares or to deposit funds in a mutual savings bank, he obtains
against a financial institution a claim which can be readily con-
vetted into cash. The institution, in turn, having acquired
ownership over a part of his demand deposit, now has addi-
tional money to lend to others who are likely to be active
spenders. Much the same thing happens when a corporation
buys the commercial paper issued by a sales finance company,
especially when the transaction is handled through a repur-
chase agreement. In these and other ways the loans of financial
intermediaries can for a lime grow quite rapidly even when
the reserves of commercial banks are severely restricted by
Federal Reserve actions. This is precisely what has happened
since 1954.
The rapid growth of financial institutions other than com-
mercial banks is not, however, the only development of recent
times that has tended to limit the control that the Federal
Reserve System can exercise over credit expansion. The emer-
gence of a large amount of federal government securities in the
portfolios of commercial banks has had a similar influence.
During the 1920's Treasury securities were a minor factor in
the operations of commercial banks. For example, they ac-
counted for 10 per cent of the assets of the member banks of
the Federal Reserve System in mid-1922 and for only 8 per
cent of their assets at the end of 1929. During the 1930's and
during the war years, however, a large part of the rapidly
growing federal debt found a home in commercial banks. At
the beginning of 1946 the member banks held 57 per cent of160TheBusinessCycle in a Changing 'World
theirassets of over 138 billion dollars in the form of Treasury
securities. Bank holdings of government debt have consider-
ably diminished since then, both in amount and in relation
to their total assets. Nevertheless, Treasury securitiesstill
amounted to 58 billion dollars, or about a third of the total
assets of the member banks, at the end of 1954 when the re-
cent boom was getting actively under way.
These large holdings of government securities add immea-
surably to the flexibility of bank management. In particular,
they enable commercial banks to replenish their supply of loan
funds, if they so wish, and thereby to circumvent for a time the
restrictions that the Federal Reserve authorities may impose on
their reserves. A bank does not like to disappoint any of its
regular customers. Nor, for that matter, does it care to turn
down a new applicant of substance and reputation. After all, if
his needs are met in whole or in part, he may well bring his
future business to the bank which was willing to go to some
trouble at a time of credit stringency to accommodate him. To
the extent that a bank holds short-term Treasury securities, it
can acquire funds for loan expansion without sustaining an
appreciable capital loss. The disposal of long-dated securities is
a more costly 'method of raising loan funds at a lime of rising
interest rates. However, a higher interest rate on a new loan
will often compensate a bank for the loss it sustains by selling
bonds. Even when that does not happen, the need to look after
a customer may of itself induce a bank to reduce its holdings
of long-term Treasury issues.
In fact, commercial banks have responded to the surging de-
mand for credit in the recent expansion by disposing of both
short-term and long-term securities on a very considerable
scale. The loans and investments of all commercial banks in-
creased only 9.2 billion dollars between the end of 1954 and
the end of 1956, or by 6 per cent over the two-year period.The New Environment of Monetary Policy161
Theiroutstanding loans, however, increased by 19.7 billion
dollars or 28 per cent. This huge expansion of loans by com-
mercial banks was accompanied and made possible in large
partbya reduction of 10.4 billion dollars in their holdings of
federal obligations.
The great volume of outstanding federal securities has in-
creased the financial maneuverability of all types of financial
institutions, not only of commercial banks. Thus, the assets of
mutual savings banks and insurance companies increased very
substantially during 1955 and 1956. The inHows of cash on ac-
count of new savings and debt repayment were not sufficient,
however, to enable the managers of these institutions to make
all the loans or acquire all the private or state and local securi-
ties that they deemed advantageous. Hence they disposed, in
the aggregate, of 3 billion dollars of their holdings of federal
obligations. The Treasury securities sold by them and by com-
mercial banks were largely bought, on balance, by individuals,
by the federal trust funds, and by various state and local in-
vestment accounts. In 1955, when the recent spurt in plant and
equipment expenditures was still in its early stages, business
corporations added a little over 4 billion dollars of Treasury
securities to their holdings. In the following year, when outlays
on investment were much larger and the stringency of the
money and capital markets was greater, they disposed of al-
most 5 billion dollars of their securities. Thus, the huge sales of
government securities by financial institutions during 1955, and
both by them and business corporations during 1956, served—
along with other devices to which I have alluded—to mobilize
the nation's cash and put it to work in the nation's markets.
This process went on in spite of and partly in response to the
efforts of the Federal Reserve System to restrain the expansion
of credit and, through that, the expansion of spending across
the nation.162TheBusiness Cycle in a Changing World
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I have suggested that various financial developments—the
growth of government expenditures, our steep tax rates, the
lesser dependence of corporations on external financing, the
greater flexibility of loan instruments, the relative decline of
commercial banks among financial intermediaries, and the large
holdings of Treasury securities by financial institutions—have
all tended to reduce the effectiveness of traditional monetary
restraints. Of course, these are not the only financial develop-
ments of recent times that bear on monetary policy. Nor have
all the changes in our financial environment worked in the
same direction. Surely, the breakdown of the international
gold standard has made it possible to base our monetary poli-
cies to a greater extent on domestic considerations than was
feasible during the 1920's. Other recent developments, such as
the emergence of a large volume of real estate mortgages
underwritten by the government, have made it easier to shift
funds from one part of the country to another or from one fi-
nancial institution to another. The large holdings of govern-
ment securities by financial institutions, business corporations,
and the general public have had a similar effect. But if these
factors have facilitated the transmission of Federal Reserve
pressures on commercial banks to other parts of the economic
community, they have also facilitated ways of escape, at least
temporarily, from these pressures. On balance, there appears
to be little doubt that the net effect of the vast changes that
have occurred in recent limes in the realm of finance has been
to blunt to some degree the effectiveness of Federal Reserve
policies aiming at the restraint of the nation's spending.
This does not mean that the Federal Reserve authorities
have inherently less power than they had during the 1920's. InThe New Environment of Monetary Policy163
atheoretical sense their power to restrain expansion is fully as
large or even larger. For not only are they able to exert pres-
sure on commercial banks by selling government securities, of
which they hold a great abundance, but they can raise the
reserve requirements of the member banks—a power they did
not have in the 1920's. Viewed in the abstract, there is almost
no limit to what the Federal Reserve System can accomplish,
despite the narrowing of the base to which its policies apply.
Just as the Federal Reserve System is capable of offsetting a
shift from demand deposits to time deposits in commercial
banks, so it could offset a shift of demand deposits from indi-
viduals to financial institutions. If the Federal Reserve authori-
ties sought to prevent the assets of all financial institutions,
taken in the aggregate, from increasing, they could in principle
force a sufficient reduction of commercial bank assets to com-
pensate for the growth in the assets of other financial institu-
lions. All this, and indeed much more, may be said of the
powers of the Federal Reserve System. The essential point of
the preceding analysis, however, is that in order to achieve a
particular effect on the nation's total expenditure in today's en-
vironment, the degree of credit restriction which needs to be
taken is likely to be appreciably greater than was the case a
generation ago. But if our economic and financial environment
has changed, the political environment has changed still more
and the changes have not been of a kind that favor highly re-
strictive credit policies.
The Employment Act of 1946 pledges the federal govern-
ment to "utilize all its plans, functions, and resources" to foster
economic expansion and to help prevent depressions. The Fed-
eral Reserve authorities, being members of the government,
are bound by this statutory declaration of policy. In principle, a
restrictive credit policy at a lime of surging demand is entirely
in hannony with the objectives of the Employment Act. Al-164The Business Cycle in a Changing World
though not all depressions spring from excessive exuberance
during periods of prosperity, that has been the course of events
in the past altogether too often. Once extensive speculation
gets under way—whether in commodities or securities or real
estate—the foundations on which the nation's prosperity rests
become insecure. So it is also when the quality of newly ex-
tended credit seriously deteriorates, or when a competitive
rush develops to construct physical facilities that, in the aggre-
gate, are well beyond current requirements. Of late, these
teachings of experience have counted heavily in the economic
thinking of government officials outside as well as within the
Federal Reserve System. But if concern over the continuance
of prosperity has at times led to credit restrictions, it has also
led to a gradual application of these restrictions. Now that our
government is committed to doing what it can to promote
maximum production and employment, the Federal Reserve
authorities are fairly bound to pursue a policy of credit re-
straint with considerable caution, lest the application of re-
straints bring on the very decline of aggregate economic activ-
ity which itis the responsibility of government to try to
prevent.
The virtual avoidance of general credit restraints over the
long stretch from 1933 to 1951 has also left its mark on current
thought and practice. The earlier policy was based on the be-
lief, which came to be held rather widely in professional and
political circles, that on the one hand, general credit controls
could check a boom with dangerous ease and, on the other
hand, that they could do little to speed recovery once a depres-
sion developed. This exaggeration of the restrictive power of
credit controls was, on a superficial view, strikingly confirmed
by the course of events in early 1953. The pressure on bank re-
serves then exercised by the Federal Reserve authorities, to-The New Environment of Monetary Policy165
gether with a substantial issue of 3¼ per cent bonds by the
Treasury, was interpreted by in the financial community
as a signal that interest rates would soon rise further and that
it would become more difficult to obtain credit. Something of a
scramble for money developed, interest rates rose briskly for a
few weeks, and some dealers were undoubtedly embarrassed.
These happenings in financial markets were not, however, a
typical response to a moderate degree of credit tightening.
More than anything else, they reflected the bewilderment of a
financial community that had become accustomed to stable in-
terest rates and had forgotten how a restrictive credit policy
works. Government officials could overlook the criticism that
"tight money" brought on the industrial recession which be-
came visible around mid-1953. They knew better, as did many
others. However, they could not escape the fact that they had
misjudged the psychology of financial markets. The memory
of this minor embarrassment understandably made them more
cautious in the next encounter with economic excesses.
Moreover, government officials—the Federal Reserve au-
thorities among them—must reckon with the opposition that
restrictive credit measures often arouse in business, labor, and
political circles. The influence of Federal Reserve actions on
the wage policies of trade unions and the pricing policies of
business firms is, at most, indirect. Surely, as we have recently
seen, a new round of wage and price increases can occur in the
face of a restrictive credit policy. But once a higher consumer
price level has been established, it becomes unrealistic to look
to the Federal Reserve System for a restoration of the former
price level. All that may reasonably be expected of the Federal
Reserve System is that it will do everything it can, within its
limited powers, to keep the price level from rising further. A
credit policy that is sufficiently restrictive to bring down the166The Business Cycle in a Changing World
price level is, to be sure, always possible. But a policy which
did that would in all likelihood bring down also the volume of
employment. Federal Reserve officials are likely to shrink from
such a course, not only because of their responsibility under
the Employment Act, but also because they are apt to feel,
whether consciously or not, a wholesome concern over the
political uproar that would follow.
Another practical factor that has tended to limit the applica-
tion of credit restraints is the recurring need of the Treasury to
borrow money. Of late, this has usually involved the refunding
of outstanding debt rather than the issue of new debt. But in
view of their magnitude and frequency, the refinancing opera-
tions of the Treasury are still a very formidable obstacle to the
consistent pursuit of a restrictive credit policy. For example,
apart from the weekly rollover of bills and three special issues
of bills, the Treasury entered the money and capital markets
four times in 1956: in March to refinance 9.5 billion dollars of
its securities, in July to refinance 12.9 billion, in August with a
new issue of 3.2 billion, and in December with a refinancing of
9.1 billion. In 1955 the Treasury made even more trips to the
financial markets and raised still larger sums, and so it has also
been this year. Treasury debt operations, of course, are not a
new thing for the Federal Reserve System. During the 1920's,
however, the federal debt was a smaller factor in financial
markets. Not only that, but the debt was then being reduced
steadily and a smaller proportion of the outstanding debt was
of a short-term character.
The current financing problems of the Treasury stem largely
from the short maturities of a great part of the outstanding
public debt. This creates not only administrative difficulties for
the Federal Reserve System; it also tends, however subtly, to
impart a bias to monetary policy. During a time of economic
boom, a Secretary of the Treasury may well feel that, unlessThe New Environment of Monetary Policy167
creditexpansion is restricted, commodity prices are likely to
rise swiftly, upset his budgetary calculations, and eventually
cause economic trouble all around. He may therefore favor a
restrictive policy and even assume a certain leadership in its
behalf. At the same time he cannot entirely overlook the fact
that when a forthcoming Treasury issue carries a higher inter-
est rate than the one falling due, it must raise at once, however
modestly, the government's expenditures. Nor can he ignore
the possibility that, in the absence of support by the Federal
Reserve System, a newly projected Treasury issue may, besides
being poorly received in financial markets, seriously upset the
prices and yields of outstanding securities, both public and pri-
vate. If he communicates such thoughts to the Chairman of
the Federal Reserve Board, he is merely acting in the line of
duty. And in fact, all this is so clearly understood and recog-
nized that the Federal Reserve authorities can be counted on
to take the Treasury's needs into account without being
prodded. The practical result is that restrictive credit actions,
which are otherwise deemed desirable, are not infrequently
postponed or that easing actions, which are otherwise deemed
undesirable, are temporarily undertaken. Once the Treasury
issue is out of the way and more or less absorbed, the Federal
Reserve authorities are again free to act. But neither the econ-
omy nor human sentiment ever stands perfectly still. Once a
restrictive action has been delayed, some subtle change in the
one or the other may cause further delays. In the end, not only
is the timing of Federal Reserve actions apt to be somewhat
distorted from the viewpoint of the interests of the general
economy, but the entire range of actions taken in the course of
a boom is likely to be somewhat less restrictive than it would
have been if the Treasury's trips to the financial markets for
substantial sums had come less frequently.168The BusinessCycle in a Changing World
HI
I have already commented on one of the two major risks that
unavoidably accompany a policy of general credit restraint—
namely, that if the policy is pushed too far, it may hasten or
bring on a business recession. The second risk is that if such a
policy is continued over a considerable period, it may have
undesirable side effects on the character or structure of the na-
tion's economic activity. With increasing frequency, the charge
has of late been made that a restrictive credit policy has un-
even effects on the economy, that general credit restraints are
selective in their practical effects, and that small businesses,
homebuilders, prospective homebuyers, and local govern-
ments, especially school districts, bear the main brunt of gen-
eral credit controls. The intensity with which these criticisms
have been urged is of itself a fact with which government offi-
cials, including the Federal Reserve authorities, have had to
reckon. Beyond that, and in the degree to which the criticisms
are valid, they raise the question whether the side effects of
general credit restraints may not offset some of the economic
benefits that could be gained by their more vigorous applica-
tion at a time of economic exuberance.
The financing difficulties of state and local governments ap-
pear to have been exaggerated in recent discussions. It is true
that some municipal issues ran into trouble as early as 1955,
while postponements of corporate issues did not come into
public view until 1956. But there is little evidence that school
bonds have suffered to any great extent in recent markets. In
the nine critical months from July 1956 to March 1957 school
bond issues were marketed at the highest rate yet recorded.
Unsold bonds were only 3 per cent of the dollar amount of
school bond offerings during this period. Taken in the aggre-The New Environment of Monetary Policy169
gate, the capital issues of state and local governments, just as
the capital issues of business corporations, have been excep-
tionally heavy this year.
The experience of small businesses during the recent period
of general credit restraint appears to be a more serious matter.
It is necessary to distinguish, of course, between the financing
difficulties of small businesses that are of a chronic nature and
those that are peculiar to a time of credit stringency. The abil-
ity of a small enterprise to expand is undoubtedly affected by
our high tax rates, which severely limit the profits that can be
ploughed back into business. Also, a small firm typically has
little or no access to the public markets for capital. All this
applies to times when credit conditions are easy just as it ap-
plies to a time of credit stringency. It is claimed, however, that
when the reserves of commercial banks are under pressure, the
financing problems of small firms are apt to become aggra-
vated. Most banks, to be sure, will do everything they can to
look after the needs of their regular customers, small or large.
But if it is hard to turn down or to meet only in part a request
for a loan by any sound business firm, it may be especially
hard when the finn is large and powerful. In any event, a large
firm of good reputation which cannot obtain credit from one
bank can ordinarily shop around and eventually obtain a loan
from another institution or, perhaps, float a public issue. op-
portunities of this type are far more limited for the typical
small business.
These judgments are based on general impressions. Facts on
this important subject are unavailable on a precise and com-
prehensive basis. There are, however, various scattered pieces
of evidence. First of all, we have the experience of the Small
Business Administration, which received almost twice as many
applications for loans in 1956 as in 1955. Not only that, but the
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in 1956 without, apparently, any change in credit standards.
Second, there is a special study by the American Bankers Asso-
ciation, based on a sample of large banks, which shows that
the dollar amount of outstanding loans of under $50,000 in-
creased a little over 14 per cent between the end of August
1955 and a year later. This is a considerable increase. Yet the
commercial, industrial, and agricultural loans of weekly re-
porting member banks, which cover a larger sample of the big
banks, show an increase of 21 per cent. Taking the two sets of
figures together, it would appear, therefore, that the dollar
amount of business loans in excess of $50,000 increased by
something more than 21 per cent. Third, we have the quarterly
compilations of new short-term loans, classified by size of loan,
and covering a sample of large banks in nineteen cities which
report to the Federal Reserve Board. According to this sample,
the dollar amount of new loans ranging from $1,000 to $10,000
declined 4 per cent between 1955 and 1956, while there was an
increase of 3 per cent in the loans from $10,000 to $100,000, of
9 per cent in loans from $100,000 to $200,000, and of 42 per
cent in loans of still larger size. Fourth, we have the quarterly
financial statements for manufacturing corporations compiled
by the Federal Trade Commission and the Securities and Ex-
change Commission. From these figures it appears that the
largest corporations, those with assets of over 100 million dol-
lars, increased their indebtedness to banks by a substantially
larger percentage between 1955 and 1957 than did small- or
medium-sized corporations. The evidence is less clear, how-
ever, when long-term debt, beyond that already included in
bank loans, is also considered.
These statistics leave much to be desired. The first piece of
evidence, drawn from the experience of the Small Business
Administration, tells nothing of the difficulties that some large
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evidence,which relates to the change in the total of outstand-
ing bank loans of under and over $50,000, rests on different
samples. The third piece of evidence, which refers to new bank
loans of varying size, is restricted to a sample of large banks
and therefore is apt to understate the over-all increase of small
loans relative to large loans. A similar bias is likely to flow, at
a time of generally rapid loan expansion, from fixed-size
classes for loans. The fourth piece of evidence, which refers
to outstanding bank loans of manufacturing corporations of
differing size,is subject to uncertain defects of coverage.
Furthermore, it makes no allowance for the changing com-
position of industry which is always an important feature
of a cyclical expansion in business. A similar limitation at-
taches also to the second and third pieces of evidence. There
are still other difficulties that attach to the statistics cited.
Nevertheless, it is difficult to escape the broad but definite im-
pression that, although the financing problems of small busi-
ness have been greatly exaggerated and although interest rate
differentials have in fact moved in favor of smaller businesses,
the recent credit restraints have had a greater impact on the
availability of credit to small businesses than they have had on
the large firms.
It also seems clear that credit restraints have had a part in
the recent decline of the homebuilding industry. In December
1954, housing starts, taken on a seasonally adjusted basis,
reached a level exceeding 1.4 million units. They have declined
since then to a level of about 1 million. Overbuilding in some
localities, higher construction and land costs nearly every-
where, and a more selective, if not also a lessened, demand
have contributed to the decline, but credit conditions appear
to have been the most important single factor. Interest rates
are a fairly large element in the cost of home ownership, par-
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therefore, rising interest rates would of themselves tend to re-
strict the volume of homebuilding. Legal impediments to the
free movement of interest rates on federally underwritten
mortgages, however, have made matters much worse.
With the rise of interest rates during the recent boom, the
maximum interest rates fixed by law or regulation for federally
underwritten mortgages soon became unrealistic and these
mortgages could ordinarily be placed or sold only at a dis-
count. The practice of discounting, however, is poorly under-
stood and sometimes arouses intemperate criticism. To avoid
possible embarrassment on this account, some financial institu-
tions concentrated increasingly on conventional mortgages.
The supply of money for underwritten mortgages, on which
the homebuilding industry has come to depend very heavily,
was therefore reduced. At the same time, as a result of the pro-
vision of law which practically requires the builder to absorb
any discount on mortgages guaranteed by the Veterans Admin-
istration, the builder's profit tended to dwindle as the discounts
became larger. Hence the inducement to build was dimin-
ished. In short, in view of our housing legislation with its spe-
cial regulation of interest rates and discounts, the recent policy
of general credit restraint acted as a selective credit control on
horn ebuilding. It would, of course, be equally correct to say
that, in view of the recent policy of general credit restraint, our
housing legislation acted as a selective credit control. Changes
in the law governing discounts which were passed by the Con-
gress this year have accentuated this difficulty, and they are
likely to do so again under conditions of tight credit.
Iv
I am led by this lengthy discussion of financial trends to three
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developments of recent times appear to have reduced the
effectiveness of Federal Reserve restraints on over-all credit
expansion, we must discipline our expectations of what can be
accomplished through general credit controls. There is little
doubt that, given enough time, the Federal Reserve System is
still capable of checking any large-scale expansion of aggregate
demand. The process of economizing on cash cannot be
stretched indefinitely by households or by the business com-
munity. As the holdings of Treasury securities by financial in-
stitutions are reduced and as the cash balances of individuals
and corporations become smaller in relation to theft transactions
and contingent needs, the avenues of escape from the pressure
applied by the Federal Reserve authorities on the reserves of
commercial banks are bound to become fewer and narrower.
This process, however, takes considerable time. Since 1954, we
have experienced a credit shortage in the sense that interest
rates have risen sharply and also in the sense that many have
borrowed less than they would have liked or wanted to bor-
row. We certainly have not had a credit shortage in the sense
that the amount of credit expansion has been small. In the
meantime, as everyone knows, the price level has risen discon-
certingly.
Second, although the side effects of a restrictive credit policy
are of little consequence if the policy is applied over a few
months, they cannot be safely ignored if the policy is extended
over years. The traditional assumption that general credit con-
trols exercise something like a uniform impact on different
sectors of the economy appears to be invalid. When the gov-
ernment embarks on a restrictive credit policy, it does this with
a view to restraining the growth of total expenditure, not to
benefit one type of activity or to injure another. In practice,
however, some branches of activity, such as those in which the
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credit restrictions. In other activities, such as consumer install-
ment buying, the effects are seriously felt only after a very sub-
stantial lag. On the other hand, small businesses and the home-
building industry are apt to feel the impact of general credit
restraints fairly promptly and more keenly. But not only do
general credit restrictions have selective effects, it also appears
that these effects may interfere with some key objectives of na-
tional economic policy—such as the extension of home owner-
ship, the promotion of sound neighborhoods, and the mainte-
nance of an environment in which small and new businesses,
which are a vital source of innovation in our economy, have a
reasonable opportunity to survive, prosper, and grow. The
government has therefore recently sought to reduce the un-
even impact of credit restrictions by enlarging the loan funds
available to the Small Business Administration, and by adopt-
ing a variety of measures in behalf of housing.
Third, in view of the limitations that attach to restrictive
Federal Reserve policies, it would be unwise to depend on the
Federal Reserve System as our sole or principal guardian of
the stability of the dollar. If the struggle against creeping infla-
lion is to be successful, we must proceed simultaneously on
numerous fronts. General credit controls have an important
place in any responsible program for protecting the stability of
the dollar. However, they need to be accompanied by other
measures of policy that, in the first place, will reduce the
burden that needs to be carried by our monetary authorities
and, in the second place, improve the chances of success in
their special sphere of activity.